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Some 650 peace agreements have been concluded between governments and armed opposition 
groups since 1990. These agreements often do not fulfil the criteria of sources in domestic or 
international law: they are negotiated outside the established lawmaking channels of domestic 
law and are signed by armed opposition groups, which are traditionally not accorded 
treaty-making capacity in international law. Yet many scholars contend that the international 
legal status of peace agreements should be recognised either as international(ised) or hybrid 
agreements. In some peace processes, negotiating parties also intend to attach international 
legal status to their agreement. Consequently, a rich repertoire has emerged on the question of 
the international legal status of peace agreements across the practice of peacemaking, 
United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) practice, domestic and international judicial and 
arbitral decisions, and scholarship. Providing a comprehensive examination of this repertoire, 
this article demonstrates that peace agreements are not yet attributed legal status in 
international law. However, it is also explained that the lack of international legal status of 
peace agreements does not yield their conclusion and implementation as precarious, as is often 
feared. Attaching international legal status to peace agreements would neither shield them from 
all domestic and international judicial challenges nor necessarily function as an incentive to 
conclude and comply with a peace agreement. The article concludes on the note that the lack of 
international legal status does not relegate peace agreements to ‘scraps of paper’, as the 
implementation of peace agreements can be enhanced by incorporation into domestic law and 
through international oversight mechanisms, including the tools at the disposal of the UNSC. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Some 650 peace agreements aiming to bring an end to intrastate  
armed conflicts have been concluded between governments and armed 
opposition groups (‘AOGs’) since 1990.1 The (international) legal status of these 
agreements typically emerges as a significant issue during peace processes. 
Signed by AOGs and negotiated outside the legally established channels of 
domestic law, peace agreements often do not possess standalone domestic legal 
status and need to be incorporated into domestic law. However, it may prove 
difficult to achieve domestic legal entrenchment and the required public, 
parliamentary and/or judicial approval in the divisive and precarious moments of 
peacemaking, particularly in regard to peace agreements that require significant 
departures from the existing laws and constitution. Furthermore, a promise to 
legally incorporate a peace agreement into domestic law may not constitute a 
sufficient incentive for AOGs to conclude an agreement, due to the risk of 
amendments to the agreement during the incorporation process and of revocation 
by future legislators.2 To avoid the difficulties of domestic legal entrenchment of 
peace agreements, some peacemaking parties, such as the Colombian parties to 
the 2016 Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and 
Lasting Peace (‘2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia)’), have turned to 
international law to render peace agreements legally binding.3 Some scholars 
 
 1 See Language of Peace (Website) <https://www.languageofpeace.org/>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/AM2Y-FFVV>. 
 2 See, eg, Arist von Hehn, The Internal Implementation of Peace Agreements after Violent 
Intrastate Conflict: Guidance for Internal Actors Responsible for Implementation (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 56, listing challenges of domestic implementation of peace 
agreements; namely, that ‘actors and constituencies that have not been part of the 
negotiation process of the agreement may try to influence the conversion of the agreement 
into domestic law’ and that ‘peace agreements typically provide for further negotiations on 
contentious issues and for further detailing of the principles’. 
 3 Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, 
Colombia–Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army, signed  
24 November 2016 (Peace Agreement) Preamble <http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/
Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/2VDN-Z7X5> (‘2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia)’):  
This Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting 
Peace is signed by the National Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP) as a Special Agreement pursuant to Article 
3, common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as per its international standing. 
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also contend that the international legal status of peace agreements should be 
recognised either as international(ised) or hybrid agreements. 4  This article 
carries out an examination of whether this position is grounded in international 
law as it currently stands. It also discusses the desirability of attaching 
international legal status to peace agreements from a policy perspective. 
Despite the attempts of peacemaking parties and the assertions of some 
scholars that peace agreements possess international legal status, domestic and 
international courts have not followed suit to date. The Constitutional Court of 
Colombia, the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (‘SCSL’) have all expressly rejected that peace agreements between 
governments and AOGs possess international legal status, while the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (‘PCA’) has at best left the question open in relation to the 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (‘CPA’). 5 The United Nations Security Council’s (‘UNSC’) 
practice, which aims to secure compliance with peace agreements, does not point 
to an unequivocal acceptance of them as sources of international legal 
obligations either. 6  To date, the rich international practice relevant to the 
international legal status of peace agreements aiming to end intrastate armed 
conflicts has not been examined comprehensively.7 Said international practice 
encapsulates state practice, including domestic judicial decisions; international 
judicial and arbitral decisions; and the UNSC resolutions pertaining to peace 
agreements. The principal aim of this article is to fill this doctrinal gap. To this 
end, Parts II and III focus on the two cumulative requirements for a peace 
agreement to be considered an international agreement: Part II focuses on the 
treaty-making capacity of AOGs under international law, while Part III examines 
whether peace agreements manifest an intention to be binding as international 
 
 4 See, eg, PH Kooijmans, ‘The Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties to 
Conflicts’ in Karel Wellens (ed), International Law: Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1998) 333, 338; Christine Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal 
Status’ (2006) 100(2) American Journal of International Law 373, 402–7 (‘Peace 
Agreements’); Scott P Sheeran, ‘International Law, Peace Agreements and 
Self-Determination: The Case of the Sudan’ (2011) 60(2) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 423; Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate 
Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 
37(1) Yale Journal of International Law 107, 143–6; Cindy Wittke, Law in the Twilight: 
International Courts and Tribunals, the Security Council and the Internationalisation of 
Peace Agreements between State and Non-State Parties (Cambridge University Press, 
2018).  
 5 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, signed 9 January 2005, 
chapeau para 4 <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369>, archived at <https://perma.cc/
B96A-FASK> (‘CPA’). For more on the arbitral award, see below Part II(C).  
 6 See below Part II(C)(2).  
 7 In addition to offering a different perspective on the international legal status of peace 
agreements, this article is more up-to-date and aims to be more comprehensive than the 
existing studies cited above n 4.  
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law, or even as law, regardless of whether AOGs have treaty-making capacity.8 
The analysis in Parts II and III reveals that peace agreements, with the below 
noted rare exceptions, are not yet accorded international legal status. 
My second aim in this article is to probe the legal, political and practical 
consequences of the conclusion that peace agreements lack standalone legal 
status. More specifically, I challenge the arguments put forward in the 
scholarship: that attributing international legal status may, first, shield a peace 
agreement from domestic and international judicial challenges and, secondly, 
function as an incentive to conclude and comply with a peace agreement. I do so 
by demonstrating both the legal shortcomings of these arguments and the 
underestimated potential drawbacks of construing peace agreements as legally 
binding (international) instruments. What is revealed consequently is that, 
in addition to lacking a basis in positive international law, the project of 
attaching international legal status to peace agreements does not have a 
straightforward policy case either. It requires a much more nuanced analysis of 
the consequences of international ‘legalisation’ of peace agreements. I conclude 
on the note that the lack of international legal status of peace agreements does 
not mean that they are only ‘scraps of paper’: peace agreements between 
governments and AOGs can be taken seriously as political agreements,  
the implementation of which can be enhanced by international supervision and 
the entrenchment of peace agreement commitments in domestic law. 
Before proceeding with the discussion of the international legal status of 
peace agreements, a terminological note is in order. This article focuses on 
formal peace agreements concluded between at least a state and an AOG with a 
view to ending an intrastate armed conflict.9 For the purposes of this article, 
‘intrastate armed conflict’ is understood as a violent conflict between a state and 
one or more AOGs. From the perspective of the laws of armed conflict, 
the intrastate armed conflicts that are addressed by the peace agreements cited in 
this article are mostly non-international armed conflicts but may also be 
international(ised) armed conflicts.10 Moreover, some violent conflicts that have 
culminated in formal peace agreements may not even have reached the threshold 
of an armed conflict as per the law of armed conflict. The 2007 post-election 
violence in Kenya, for example, did not amount to an armed conflict but was 
 
 8 Although recourse to the criterion of ‘intention’ in the identification of treaties is 
problematised in scholarship, it is not necessary for the purposes of this article to engage 
with this discussion. The acceptance of this non-formal criterion in the mainstream theory of 
sources of international law suffices to justify its examination in this article. On the role of 
‘intent’ in law-identification, see generally Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources 
of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 178–82 (‘Formalism and the Sources of International Law’); Jan Klabbers, 
The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) ch III.  
 9 For a discussion of peace agreement definition and classification, see generally Christine 
Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 47–66 (‘On the Law of Peace’).  
 10 On the concepts of ‘non-international armed conflict’ and ‘international(ised) armed 
conflict’, see Marko Milanovic and Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, ‘A Taxonomy of Armed 
Conflict’ in Nigel D White and Christian Henderson (eds), Research Handbook on 
International Conflict and Security Law: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, and Jus post Bellum 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) 256. See also International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘How Is the 
Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’ (Opinion Paper, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, March 2008). 
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resolved with a peace agreement in 2008.11  The implications of the legal 
qualification of a conflict for the legal status of a peace agreement, if any, are 
mentioned in the article where relevant. 
II TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Due to the presence of non-state parties and their disputed treaty-making 
capacity in international law, peace agreements between governments and AOGs 
are not accorded recognition as international treaties under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).12  The VCLT provides that 
‘international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of 
international law or between such other subjects of international law’ retain their 
legal force and are governed by the applicable international law.13 However, 
it does not provide any clarity as to who the non-state subjects of international 
law are or which subjects of international law are accorded treaty-making 
capacity in international law.14 Therefore, as the question of the treaty-making 
 
 11 Acting Together for Kenya: Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition 
Government, Government/Party of National Unity–Orange Democratic Movement,  
signed 28 February 2008 (Peace Agreement) <https://peacemaker.un.org/kenya-
coalitiongovernmentpartnership2008>, archived at <https://perma.cc/9LD3-ENDQ>.  
 12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 
331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 2(1)(a).  
 13 Ibid art 3.  
 14 The earlier work of the International Law Commission enumerates ‘insurgent groups’ 
among the subjects of international law; however, whether the referred ‘insurgents’ can be 
as broadly understood as to include the contemporary AOGs is unclear. It is notable that the 
1962 draft of the VCLT refers to insurgents as ‘international entities’, which seems to allude 
to the historical concepts of insurgency and belligerency, where recognition as such by 
parent or third states played a constitutive role: see ‘Report of the International Law 
Commission Covering the Work of Its Fourteenth Session, 24 April – 29 June 1962’ [1962] 
II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 157, 162; ‘Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth 
Session: Geneva, 4 May – 19 July 1966’ [1966] II Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 169, 188–9 (‘1966 Report of the ILC’); Emily Crawford, ‘Insurgency’ in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(Oxford University Press, online at June 2015) [1]–[2]. However, the statuses of insurgency 
and belligerency have fallen into desuetude: see generally Katharine Fortin, 
The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 
2017) 97–101. But see Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 20, arguing that a state may in future lawfully recognise a 
situation as belligerency. At any rate, historically, belligerents had the capacity to enter into 
agreements with the recognising state(s) only in relation to armed conflict-related matters 
such as consular or trade relations: Fortin (n 14) 97. Therefore, even if contemporary AOGs 
were to be recognised as belligerents, it would be doubtful whether the accorded 
treaty-making capacity extended to the conclusion of a peace agreement, the scope of whose 
provisions often reach beyond matters strictly related to an armed conflict.  
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capacity of AOGs cannot be settled merely by reference to art 3 of the VCLT, 
the inquiry needs to extend to general international law.15 
In this respect, three main views on the treaty-making capacity of AOGs, 
particularly in relation to the legal status of peace agreements, can be identified 
in international practice and scholarship. The most common view among the 
proponents of the attribution of international legal status to peace agreements is 
that AOGs acquire a limited treaty-making capacity by virtue of becoming a 
party to a peace agreement, either due to the recognition of the combated state or 
due to the ‘internationalised’ nature of an agreement. The involvement of 
international actors in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, 
references to (issues addressed by) international law in peace agreements and 
exhortations of the UNSC for compliance with peace agreements are taken as 
indicators of ‘internationalisation’ in this respect.16 The second view suggests 
that some AOGs acquire treaty-making capacity by virtue of the state of armed 
conflict and their exercise of effective control over a territory.17 The third view, 
which is dominant in international practice, is that peace agreements do not 
possess international legal status, due to the lack of treaty-making capacity of 
AOGs. The next three sections explore these views respectively, concluding that 
the last approach remains the dominant position in international law. 
A Recognition of the Treaty-Making Capacity of AOGs through a Peace 
Agreement 
1 Recognition by the Combated State 
By entering into peace agreements with AOGs, do combated states implicitly 
confer a limited treaty-making capacity on them? The international legal system 
has evolved to recognise the capacity of states to delegate treaty-making capacity 
 
 15 It must be noted from the outset that the discussion in this article concerns the treaty-making 
capacity of AOGs. It is increasingly accepted today that, having been addressees of 
obligations under international (humanitarian) law, AOGs have some form of international 
legal personality: see, eg, Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition 
Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 57; Fortin (n 14) 118; 
Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart Publishing, 
2016) 59. This, however, does not necessarily denote that they enjoy lawmaking, including 
treaty-making, capacity: Fortin (n 14) 98–9. The view that different subjects of international 
law possess different capacities is in line with the International Court of Justice’s opinion 
that ‘[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or 
in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community’: 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174, 178.  
 16 See, eg, Cindy Daase, ‘The Redistribution of Resources in Internationalized Intra-State 
Peace Processes by Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Security Council Resolutions’ 
(2011) 3(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law 23, 27–8; Sheeran (n 4) 436, 442; 
Kooijmans (n 4) 338; Gregory H Fox, Kristen E Boon and Isaac Jenkins, ‘The Contributions 
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to the Law of Non-International Armed 
Conflict: New Evidence of Customary International Law’ (2018) 67(3) American University 
Law Review 649, 678.  
 17 See, eg, Antonio Cassese, ‘The Special Court and International Law: The Decision 
concerning the Lomé Agreement Amnesty’ (2004) 2(4) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1130, 1134.  
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to international organisations through their constituent documents 18  or to 
sub-state entities through the domestic legal system.19 Therefore, some scholars 
suggest that states can be assumed to confer limited treaty-making capacity on 
AOGs by entering into agreements with them.20 However, even if an intention to 
create an internationally binding agreement can be identified among the parties, 
it remains disputed whether a single state can confer treaty-making capacity on 
an AOG and therefore elevate an agreement to the status of an international 
agreement. 
The ‘recognition by the combated state’ view resembles the view that a 
private person who is a party to an ‘internationalised’ state contract, that is, 
a contract between at least one state and one foreign private law person, gains 
limited international legal personality. This view was put forward by the sole 
arbitrator René-Jean Dupuy in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Libya 
(‘Texaco v Libya’) arbitral ruling, where he held that ‘the private person has only 
a limited capacity and his quality as a subject of international law does enable 
him only to invoke, in the field of international law, the rights which he derives 
from the contract’.21 In this view, the limited international legal personality of 
the private person concerned derives from its recognition by the state.22 
However, this decision has been criticised in literature and has not been followed 
in judicial practice.23 The SCSL’s statement in Prosecutor v Kallon (‘Kallon’) 
that ‘what is a treaty or an international agreement is not determined by the 
classification of a transaction by a State, but by whether the agreement is 
regarded as such under international law’ seems to reflect the current state of 
 
 18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
or between International Organizations, opened for signature 21 March 1986, 25 ILM 543 
(not yet in force) art 6. See also James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 9th ed, 2019) 168–9. 
 19 See Duncan B Hollis, ‘Why State Consent Still Matters: Non-state Actors, Treaties, and the 
Changing Sources of International Law’ (2005) 23(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law 
137, 148. It must be noted that the conferred capacity in this case concerns the treaty 
relations of sub-state entities with third states but not with parent states.  
 20 See, eg, Roberts and Sizakumaran (n 4) 120. Even if it is assumed that a state may confer 
treaty-making capacity on AOGs via a peace agreement, the binding status would ultimately 
depend on the intention of parties to create an internationally binding agreement: see below 
Part III. See also Luisa Vierucci, ‘“Special Agreements” between Conflicting Parties in the 
Case-Law of the ICTY’ in Bert Swart, Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter (eds), The Legacy 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 401, 411–12 (‘Special Agreements’), who argues that AOGs and agreements with 
AOGs derive their international legal status from the content of the agreement and intention 
of the parties.  
 21 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Libya (Award on the Merits) (1978) 17 ILM 1, 17 [47] 
(‘Texaco v Libya’).  
 22 Ibid 17–18 [48], quoting FA Mann et al, ‘Contrats entre Etats et personnes privées 
étrangères’ [Contracts between States and Foreign Private Persons] (1975) 11(2) 
Revue belge de droit international 562, 570; FV García Amador, Special Rapporteur, 
‘International Responsibility. Fourth Report’ [1959] II Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1, 32.  
 23 Eva Kassoti, ‘The Normative Status of Unilateral Ad Hoc Commitments by Non-State 
Armed Actors in Internal Armed Conflicts: International Legal Personality and Lawmaking 
Capacity Distinguished’ (2017) 22(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 67, 80;  
Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 124–5. 
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international law in this regard.24 Until the treaty-making capacity of AOGs is 
accepted in international law, the conclusion remains that a single state cannot 
attribute this capacity to AOGs and thus international legal status to peace 
agreements. 
Beyond the contested legal basis of the view that states recognise the 
treaty-making capacity of AOGs and the international legal status of peace 
agreements by signing an agreement with AOGs, the difficulties of applying this 
view in practice should also be considered. When the determination of the 
treaty-making capacity of AOGs is connected to the recognition of the state 
party, states would have to clarify their position, for example, through the 
language used in a peace agreement, as to whether they intend to enter into an 
internationally binding agreement with an AOG or not. In fragile peacemaking 
settings, where constructive ambiguity and silence play a crucial role in reaching 
agreements, 25 this may place an additional burden on negotiators. Moreover,  
this basis for the legal status of peace agreements falls short of mitigating the 
concerns directed at the view that peace agreements lack international legal 
status, in that it too leaves the determination of the legal status of an agreement 
to the discretion of the state. 26  Therefore, it may not provide sufficient 
guarantees of compliance and equality between parties to convince AOGs to 
conclude peace agreements. 
2 Recognition by Virtue of an ‘Internationalised’ Peace Agreement 
A second view is that in the case of an ‘internationalised’ peace agreement 
signed by the representative of a third state or international organisation, 
the agreement gains international character by virtue of the AOG’s intercourse 
on the international plane.27 The 1994 Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan 
government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(‘UNITA’), co-signed by the Special Representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General in Angola in the presence of the representatives of the United 
States, Portugal and Russia, is one of the many examples of ‘internationalised’ 
peace agreements.28 Reviewing the Protocol, PH Kooijmans contended that an 
AOG acquires some form of international legal personality — which is by its 
nature limited to the duration of the implementation of the peace agreement — 
not because it is a party to an internal armed conflict, a de facto regime or a 
 
 24 Prosecutor v Kallon (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case No SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), 
13 March 2004) [44] (‘Kallon’). See also Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Article 3: International 
Agreements Not within the Scope of the Present Convention’ in Olivier Dörr and Kirsten 
Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, 
2nd ed, 2018) 55, 60.  
 25 Stephen John Stedman, ‘Introduction’ in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and 
Elizabeth M Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) 1, 9–10; Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: 
Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (United States Institution of Peace, 1996) 220–1.  
 26 See Murray (n 15) 49–50. 
 27 On the role of AOG intercourse on the international plane in various conceptions of 
international legal personality, see Fortin (n 14) 88.  
 28 Letter Dated 9 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United 
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR, UN Doc 
S/1994/1441 (22 December 1994) annex (‘Lusaka Protocol’).  
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target of the UNSC measures, but due to its part in the ‘internationalised’ peace 
agreement.29 This is so in the case of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, according to 
Kooijmans, as the UNITA must have committed itself to the United Nations as 
well as to the Angolan government by signing a settlement that is ‘co-signed’ by 
the Secretary-General’s representative.30 
Kooijmans’ argument was addressed explicitly by the SCSL in Kallon and 
implicitly by the Supreme Court of the Philippines concerning the 
constitutionality of the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral 
Domain Aspect of the GRP–MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 
(‘MOA-AD’) between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(‘MILF’).31 Both courts rejected the argument, opining that the roles assumed by 
international actors in peace agreements did not in and of themselves make these 
actors parties to the said agreements.32 The Supreme Court of the Philippines 
further emphasised that the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the 
MOA-AD were addressed not to third states or international organisations but 
only to the MILF.33 The Court rightly held that  
the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is 
signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean 
that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international 
law.34  
When a third state or international organisation signs a peace agreement as a 
witness, guarantor or mediator, this signature does not automatically result in 
 
 29 Kooijmans (n 4) 338–40. However, the text of the Lusaka Protocol, notwithstanding 
Kooijmans’ interpretation, suggests that the Secretary-General’s representative signed the 
agreement only in the capacity of mediator, and the parties to the agreement remained the 
government and signatory AOG: see Lusaka Protocol, UN Doc S/1994/1441 (n 28) 2.  
 30 Kooijmans (n 4) 338. See also Nico Krisch, ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol 2, 1237, 
1270–1, who states that non-state actors gain partial international legal personality by being 
recognised by an internationalised peace agreement or through UNSC measures; 
Daase (n 16) 65–6, who refers to the Lomé Peace Agreement and Accra Peace Agreement as 
internationalised peace agreements, whereby armed groups commit themselves both to their 
counterparts and to ‘the UN, in particular the SC, as a mediator and de facto guarantor for 
the implementation of the agreement and the peace process’; Wittke (n 4) 192–3. 
 31 Kallon (n 24) [38]; Province of North Cotobato v Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral 
Domain (2008) 589 Philippine Reports 387 (Carpio Morales J) (Supreme Court of the 
Philippines) <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/47263>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/C4H9-LNZB>. (‘Province of North Cotobato’); Memorandum of 
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP–MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace 
of 2001, Philippines–Moro Islamic Liberation Front, signed 5 August 2008 (Peace 
Agreement) <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-memorandum-ancestral-domains2008>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/5WTS-NYSS>. 
 32 Kallon (n 24) [39]; Province of North Cotobato (n 31).  
 33 Province of North Cotobato (n 31).  
 34 Ibid.  
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these actors assuming legal obligations under the peace agreement.35 Nor does it 
transform the peace agreement into an international agreement. However, 
a number of peace agreements are explicitly concluded as treaties, whereby third 
states assume international obligations, despite the presence of AOG signatories. 
The next section examines the legal status of such peace agreements with a 
double character. 
3 Peace Agreements with a Double Character: Third States as Signatories 
Some intrastate armed conflicts have been brought to an end with the 
conclusion of agreements that have been signed by more than one state and one 
or more AOGs. A prominent example is the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1995, commonly referred to as the Dayton 
Peace Agreement.36  The main agreement was concluded in the form of an 
international treaty signed by three states: the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
However, the 12 annexes attached to this main agreement were signed by 
varying combinations of these three states and the two sub-state entities: the 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such peace 
agreements may be considered agreements with a double character: they may 
 
 35 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 
93–4. See also Michael Wood, ‘The Law of Treaties and the UN Security Council: Some 
Reflections’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 244, 245; Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for 
Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of Jus post Bellum as a Legal Concept’ 
(2010) 43(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 119, 143–4, discussing Letter Dated 
5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN Doc S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001) annex (‘Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government 
Institutions’). 
 36 Letter Dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 50th sess, 
Agenda Item 28; UN SCOR, 50th sess, UN Docs A/50/790 and S/1995/999 (30 November 
1995) annex (‘General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’) 
(‘Dayton Peace Agreement’). Other examples include: Letter Dated 24 February 2015 from 
the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2015/135 (25 February 2015) annex I (‘Protocol on the 
Outcome of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on Joint Steps Aimed at the 
Implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P Proshenko, and the 
Initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V Putin’) (‘Minsk I ’); Letter Dated  
12 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the 
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 69th sess, Agenda Item 32; 
UN SCOR, 50th sess, UN Docs A/69/778 and S/2015/110 (13 February 2015) annex II 
(‘Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Accords’); Agreement on 
Further Development of Georgian–Ossetian Peaceful Settlement Process and on Joint 
Control Commission, signed 31 October 1994 (Peace Agreement) 
<https://peacemaker.un.org/georgian-agreement-jcc1994>, archived at <https://perma.cc/
3KUT-UTLR>; Letter Dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to 
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/1999/815 
(23 July 1999) annex (‘Ceasefire Agreement’) (‘Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement’).  
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constitute international treaties between the states party and intrastate political 
agreements between the state and non-state parties (AOGs) to the conflict.37 
Two such agreements have appeared before the International Court of Justice 
(‘ICJ’) to date. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ 
considered whether the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement ‘constituted consent to the 
presence of Ugandan troops on the territory’ of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (‘DRC’) in the context of the DRC’s allegations of the acts of aggression 
perpetrated by Uganda in its territory.38 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was 
signed on 10 July 1999 by the representatives of Angola, the DRC, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and was witnessed by representatives from 
Namibia, the Organisation of African Unity, the Southern African Development 
Community and the UN.39 Two Congolese rebel groups, the Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo and Congolese Rally for Democracy, also signed the 
Agreement.40  The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement includes a calendar for the 
orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the DRC,41 and it 
was the contention of Uganda that the relevant provisions constituted consent to 
the presence of its troops in the territory of Congo from the date of the 
conclusion of the Agreement.42 The Court, however, held that 
[t]he provisions of the Lusaka Agreement thus represented an agreed modus 
operandi for the parties. They stipulated how the parties should move forward. 
They did not purport to qualify the Ugandan military presence in legal terms. 
In accepting this modus operandi the DRC did not ‘consent’ to the presence of 
Ugandan troops. It simply concurred that there should be a process to end that 
reality in an orderly fashion.43 
 
 37 Two peace agreements, the 1991 Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Cambodia and the 
1998 Belfast Agreement regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland, resemble peace 
agreements with a double character yet remain distinct from them. The parties to the 1991 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Cambodia are the 19 states that participated at the Paris 
Conference on Cambodia, where the Supreme National Council (‘SNC’), which embodied 
the four conflicting factions in the country, represented Cambodia. Therefore, despite 
including non-state actors under the umbrella of the SNC, the Agreement remained an 
international treaty between the 19 signatory states. See Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from 
the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to 
the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item 24; UN SCOR, 46th sess, 
UN Docs A/46/608 and S/23177 (30 October 1991) annex (‘Final Act of the Paris 
Conference on Cambodia’) (‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Cambodia’). For the list 
of the 19 states and composition of the SNC, see Steven R Ratner, ‘The Cambodia 
Settlement Agreements’ (1993) 87(1) American Journal of International Law 1, 1 n 1, 9–12. 
On the other hand, the 1998 Belfast Agreement is composed of two agreements: an internal 
settlement between multiple parties in Northern Ireland and an international treaty between 
Ireland and the United Kingdom annexed to the multi-party settlement. See The Belfast 
Agreement, signed 10 April 1998 (Peace Agreement) <https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/the-belfast-agreement>, archived at <https://perma.cc/7NKA-QFHE> (‘Belfast 
Agreement’). 
 38 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 209 [92] (‘Armed Activities’).  
 39 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, UN Doc S/1999/815 (n 36).  
 40 Ibid ch 10 arts 10(1), III(20); Armed Activities (n 38) 319 [51] (Judge Koojimans).  
 41 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, UN Doc S/1999/815 (n 36) annex B (‘Calendar for the 
Implementation of Cease-Fire Agreement’). 
 42 Armed Activities (n 38) 209 [92]. 
 43 Ibid 211 [99].  
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By reference to this paragraph, some scholars argue that the ICJ downplayed 
the legal force of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement by treating it as a ‘modus 
operandi’ or merely as a political instrument.44  The characterisation of the 
Agreement as a modus operandi, however, seems to relate to its function of 
clarifying the withdrawal process rather than its legal status. The Court’s 
decision that the withdrawal calendar does not constitute consent, but only 
provides for the solution of a reality on the ground, does not necessarily detract 
from the legal force of the Agreement. The Court merely interpreted the 
Agreement in a way that led to the dismissal of Uganda’s claim that the 
Agreement constituted consent to Uganda’s presence in the DRC without 
denouncing the legal force of the Agreement. Neither the Court nor the parties 
contested the legal force of the Agreement; in fact, they relied on its 
provisions.45 What is notable in this case in relation to peace agreements with a 
double character is that the Court did not consider the existence of armed group 
signatories as detracting from the international legal force of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement as it applied to the states party. Although the Court did not 
pronounce on the legal status of the Agreement, it expressly referred to it as a 
binding international agreement in its order of provisional measures of 1 July 
2000.46 
Secondly, in its order of provisional measures in Ukraine v Russian 
Federation, the ICJ reminded the parties that the UNSC endorsed the Protocol 
on the Results of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (‘Minsk II 
Agreement’) and stated that it ‘expect[ed] the Parties, through individual and 
joint efforts, to work for the full implementation of this “Package of Measures” 
in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the eastern regions of 
Ukraine’.47 The Court indicated its expectation of implementation of the Minsk 
II Agreement as ‘an additional measure aimed at ensuring the non-aggravation of 
the dispute between the Parties’ after the operative paragraphs of the order.48 
Although non-implementation of the Agreement may be deemed by the Court as 
an aggravation of the dispute, it is difficult to infer from the relevant paragraph 
whether the Court considers the Agreement as a source of international 
 
 44 See, eg, Andrej Lang, ‘“Modus Operandi” and the ICJ’s Appraisal of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement in the Armed Activities Case: The Role of Peace Agreements in International 
Conflict Resolution’ (2008) 40(Special Issue) New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 107, 113–25; Alexia Solomou, ‘Comparing the Impact of the 
Interpretation of Peace Agreements by International Courts and Tribunals on Legal 
Accountability and Legal Certainty in Post-Conflict Societies’ (2014) 27(2) Leiden Journal 
of International Law 495, 512.  
 45 See also Serena Forlati, ‘Coercion as a Ground Affecting the Validity of Peace Treaties’ in 
Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 320, 325–6.  
 46 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) (Provisional Measures) [2000] ICJ Rep 111, 127 [37]. The Court also refers to the 
various agreements concluded between the DRC and Uganda, including the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement, as ‘treaties’: Armed Activities (n 38) 212 [105]. 
 47 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Ukraine v Russian Federation) (Provisional Measures) [2017] ICJ Rep 
104, 140 [104] (‘Ukraine v Russian Federation’).  
 48 Ibid 139 [103].  
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obligations.49 However, any conclusion that the Minsk II Agreement is not a 
binding international agreement between states party would possibly be due to 
the lack of requisite intention on the part of the states concerned rather than the 
existence of non-state actor signatories.50 
Although peace agreements with a double character can be sources of 
international legal rights and obligations as between their states party, the same 
cannot be said for the obligations assumed by the states party towards the AOGs 
under such an agreement and vice versa. The legal status of such obligations 
remains disputed under international law, as in the case of peace agreements 
between only a state and an AOG. It can be said that the ‘contrived treaty form’ 
may enhance compliance by demonstrating a formalised commitment to the 
agreement by states party and by ‘locking’ AOGs into a formal document.51 
However, beyond this symbolic effect, the treaty form of the peace agreements 
with a double character does not affect the legal status of an agreement as 
between the states party and the AOG(s). 
B Treaty-making Capacity and Effective Control over a Territory 
Another approach suggested for the determination of the international legal 
status of peace agreements is to recognise the inherent treaty-making capacity of 
AOGs by virtue of the state of armed conflict and their effective territorial 
control. For example, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur stated 
that ‘all insurgents that have reached a certain threshold of organization, stability 
and effective control of territory … possess international legal personality’ and 
that the two AOGs that operate in Darfur, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (‘SPLM/SPLA’) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement, ‘possess under customary international law the power to 
enter into binding international agreements’. 52  The view that AOGs acquire 
treaty-making capacity upon becoming a party to an armed conflict and 
establishing de facto control over a territory also finds support in scholarship. 
For example, arguing that the 1999 Peace Agreement between the Government of 
 
 49 The ICJ’s ‘function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it’: Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(1). Therefore, it may be 
argued that the Court considered the Minsk II Agreement to be an international treaty. 
However, this conclusion is weakened by the fact that the Court did not refer to the 
Agreement in the settling of the dispute before it but referred to it as the basis of a 
provisional measure to prevent the non-aggravation of the dispute. 
 50 It must be noted that, contrary to Ukraine’s position that Russia incurs obligations under the 
Minsk Agreements, Russia insists that it has signed the Agreements only as a mediator: 
Oleksandr Merezhko, ‘Russo–Ukrainian War: Kremlin Denials Prevent Progress towards 
Peace’, Atlantic Council (Blog Post, 14 July 2020) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/ukrainealert/russo-ukrainian-war-kremlin-denials-prevent-progress-towards-peace/>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/3KNC-Z86P>. 
 51 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (n 4) 389–91.  
 52 Letter Dated 31 January 2005 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/2005/60 (1 February 2005) annex (‘Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General’) 55 [172], 55 [174]. The SCSL 
has been critiqued by some scholars, who consider its dismissal of the treaty status of the 
Lomé Peace Agreement in Kallon to be cursory: Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 4) 145, citing 
Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (n 4) 387; Cassese (n 17) 1134–5. See also Kallon (n 24) 45–50. 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s conclusion, which is hastier than the Kallon decision, has 
been cited as practice in support of the treaty-making capacity of AOGs: Roberts and 
Sivakumaran (n 4) 145–6.  
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Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 53  (‘Lomé 
Peace Agreement’) is an international treaty, Antonio Cassese holds that 
‘[i]nsurgents in a civil war may acquire international standing and the capacity to 
enter into international agreements if they show effective control over some part 
of the territory and the armed conflict is large-scale and protracted’.54 
Among the proponents of this view, the scope of the treaty-making capacity 
of AOGs remains contested, particularly in relation to whether it is limited to 
matters that are strictly related to armed conflict, such as the exchange of 
prisoners or establishing an armistice,55 and to the conclusion of agreements only 
with third states.56 At any rate, this view is not supported sufficiently by state 
practice57 and remains contested also on policy grounds, as it may incentivise 
AOGs to exert more violence to establish territorial control.58 Finally, even if it 
is assumed that AOGs that exercise territorial control acquire the capacity to 
conclude binding peace agreements under international law, this does not 
provide a general basis for the legal status of peace agreements concluded with 
AOGs that do not exercise such control. 
C Lack of Treaty-Making Capacity of AOGs 
Despite the vast scholarship arguing that AOGs acquire treaty-making 
capacity under certain conditions or that international law should evolve towards 
the recognition of the role of AOGs in lawmaking in general, the current state of 
international law does not seem to attribute treaty-making capacity to AOGs or 
international legal status to peace agreements concluded between governments 
and AOGs. As mentioned in the previous sections, the following review of the 
state practice regarding peace agreements does not point to the recognition of 
treaty-making capacity of AOGs in customary international law. 
First of all, only a small number of peace agreements explicitly claim legal 
status, with only one of them — the 2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia) — 
claiming international legal status.59 Furthermore, domestic courts have so far 
refused to attach international status to peace agreements. The Supreme Court of 
the Philippines, citing the Kallon decision discussed below, held that the 
MOA-AD between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the 
MILF would not be an international agreement, were it to be signed, due to the 
 
 53 Letter Dated 12 July 1999 from the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim of the Permanent Mission 
of Togo to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc 
S/1999/777 (12 July 1999) annex (‘Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra 
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone’) (‘Lomé Peace Agreement’). 
 54 Cassese (n 17) 1134.  
 55 Robert Kolb, The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 18.  
 56 Schmalenbach (n 24) 77, arguing that the treaty-making capacity of AOGs is limited to the 
conclusion of agreements with third states in relation to matters arising from the control 
over a territory and conduct of armed conflict, and that it cannot be assumed to extend to the 
conclusion of agreements between AOGs and the combated government, including special 
agreements, which remain of non-international character.  
 57 Hollis (n 19) 151, who states that the legal status of unauthorised sub-state arrangements 
with third states remains ambiguous, citing Canada’s rejection of the binding character of a 
number of agreements between Quebec and France. 
 58 Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 4) 120–1. 
 59 2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia) (n 3) Preamble, s 6.1.8.  
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lack of treaty-making capacity of the MILF.60 Ruling on a special agreement 
concluded between the government and an AOG, the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia also held that such agreements ‘are not, strictly speaking, treaties,  
as they are not established between entities subject to public international law 
but between the parties to an internal conflict, which are subject to international 
humanitarian law’.61 
  In a case brought before the Constitutional Court of Burundi, the Court 
had to consider whether the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
for Burundi 62  (‘APR Agreement’) had supra-constitutional force in order to 
decide whether the terms of the APR Agreement prevailed over the 
Constitution of the Republic of Burundi in the context of a norm conflict about 
presidential term limits.63 As to the normative nature of the APR Agreement,  
the Constitutional Court limited its analysis to whether the APR Agreement had 
supra-constitutional force over the Constitution and did not pronounce on the 
legal force of the APR Agreement per se. However, it is notable that the 
Permanent Representative of Burundi to the UN asserted that the 
APR Agreement was a ‘political agreement’ and could not take precedence over 
the Constitution.64 Furthermore, the US Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region 
of Africa emphasised the relevance of the APR Agreement to the settlement of 
the crisis by urging the Burundi government ‘to ensure that the upcoming 
elections are consistent with the Arusha Accords’, yet added that the US was 
‘not making a legal argument here’.65 
The few relevant decisions of international courts and tribunals addressing the 
legal status of peace agreement to date have not affirmed the recognition of the 
treaty-making capacity of AOGs in international law either. The PCA 
pronounced, albeit very briefly, on the legal status of a peace agreement and held 
that the CPA between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA is not a 
treaty as defined by the VCLT but an agreement between the government of a 
sovereign state and a political movement that ‘may — or may not — govern over 
 
 60 Province of North Cotobato (n 31).  
 61 Constitutional Court of Colombia, C-225/95, 18 May 1995, [17] [tr Marco Sassòli, Antoine 
A Bouvier and Anne Quintin (eds), How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and 
Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law 
(International Committee of the Red Cross, 3rd ed, 2011) vol 3, 2245 [17]]. 
 62 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed 28 August 2000 
<https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1207>, archived at <https://perma.cc/7NK9-KQXT> 
(‘APR Agreement’). 
 63 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Burundi, RCCB 303, 4 May 2015 
<https://www.ihrda.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Arret-de-la-Cour-Constitutionnelle-du-
Burudi-sur-le-nombre-de-mandat-presidentiel1.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/YL9C-
JZLD> [‘RCCB 303’, Pan African Lawyers Union (Web Document) 
<https://www.ihrda.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Judgment-of-Burundi-Constitutional-
Court-ENGLISH-Translation.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/7TEV-79N2>].  
 64 Ambassador Albert Shingiro, ‘Speech of His Excellency Ambassador Albert Shingiro, 
Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations at the Meeting of Burundi 
Configuration of the United Nations Peace Building Commission’ (Speech, United Nations 
Peace Building Commission, 18 March 2015) <http://www.burundimission.org/speech-of-
his-excellency-ambassador-albert-shingiro-at-the-meeting-of-burundi-configuration-of-the-
u-n-peace-building-commission/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/56H8-78U7>. 
 65 Russ Feingold, ‘Sustained American Attention to the Great Lakes Region of Africa’ 
(Speech, United States Institute of Peace, 24 February 2015) 10 <https://www.usip.org/
publications/2015/02/feingold-presses-three-african-states-elections>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/3MGH-CKK8>.  
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a sovereign state in the near future’.66 The Tribunal further refers to international 
law as being applicable to the dispute in addition to and separate from the CPA, 
which is part of the lex specialis prescribed by the parties.67 This further clarifies 
that the CPA was not regarded as an international agreement by the Tribunal. 
The SCSL in the Kallon decision, where the Court had to decide on whether 
the amnesty granted by virtue of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement constituted a 
bar to its jurisdiction,68 reached a similar conclusion following a more elaborate 
reasoning. Article 9(3) of the Lomé Peace Agreement provides that  
the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is 
taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect 
of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those 
organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present 
Agreement.69  
Opposing the jurisdiction of the SCSL, the defence counsel submitted that the 
Lomé Peace Agreement was a binding international agreement and that allowing 
the prosecution of the alleged crimes covered by the Lomé Peace Agreement 
amnesty would constitute an abuse of process.70 Upholding its jurisdiction, the 
Court unequivocally held that the Lomé Peace Agreement ‘cannot be 
characterised as an international instrument’ and that ‘[t]he RUF had no 
treaty-making capacity so as to make the Lomé Agreement an international 
agreement’. 71  In reaching this conclusion, the Court also evaluated whether 
insurgent groups like the Revolutionary United Front (‘RUF’) were vested with 
international personality owing to their obligations under international 
humanitarian law. It found that insurgent groups were bound by international 
humanitarian law by virtue of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
without acquiring international personality, adding that the ‘convincing’ theory 
is that AOGs are obliged ‘as a matter of international customary law’.72 Lastly, 
the Court emphasised that the government of Sierra Leone entered into an 
agreement with the RUF regarding it only as ‘a faction within Sierra Leone’ and 
that the agreement may create binding obligations and rights in municipal law.73 
 
 66 Delimiting Abyei Area (Sudan v Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) (Final Award) 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2008-07, 22 July 2009) [427] (‘Delimiting Abyei 
Area’).  
 67 Ibid [396], [427], [434]. Although the Tribunal considered international law, particularly the 
VCLT, in the interpretation of the 2005 CPA and the annexed Abyei Protocol ‘as part of the 
general principles [of law] referred to in Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement’, reference 
to international law in the interpretation of an agreement does not suffice to conclude that 
the Tribunal considered the agreement to be a binding international agreement: at [572]. 
 68 Kallon (n 24) [66]–[74].  
 69 Lomé Peace Agreement, UN Doc S/1999/777 (n 53) art 9(3).  
 70 Kallon (n 24) [22]. See also at [30]–[31].  
 71 Ibid [42], [48]. See also Yoram Dinstein, Non-international Armed Conflicts in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 49, who argues that ‘[a] peace 
accord between an incumbent Government and non-State actors, however important, does 
not constitute a treaty’ and that the non-state signatory does not become a subject of 
international law by virtue of being a party to such an agreement ‘unless a peace accord 
leads to secession’.  
 72 Kallon (n 24) [45]–[47].  
 73 Ibid [47]–[49]. The Agreement was already incorporated into the domestic law of Sierra 
Leone through the Lomé Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act, 1999 (Sierra Leone): 
Kallon (n 24) [25]. 
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Beyond the state practice in relation to peace agreements and the mentioned 
judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of customary 
international law, the state practice regarding the conclusion of special 
agreements as per Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
UNSC practice on peace agreements may also shed light on the treaty-making 
capacity of AOGs and the legal status of the peace agreements they conclude. 
Therefore, the next two sections focus on these bodies of practice respectively. 
1 Peace Agreements: Special Agreements as per Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions? 
Especially following the conclusion of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement 
(Colombia), which was signed by the parties expressly as a special agreement, 
the question of whether the legal force of peace agreements can be traced back to 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions came to prominence.74 First, 
the answer to this depends on whether peace agreements can be classified as 
special agreements in terms of their contents. Common Article 3 encourages 
parties to armed conflicts to enter into special agreements with a view to 
bringing into force other provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which are not 
otherwise applicable in a non-international armed conflict.75 Therefore, the aim 
and contents of a special agreement are confined to the sphere of international 
humanitarian law and, to a limited extent, to international human rights law. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross’ Commentary on the Second 
Geneva Convention (‘ICRC Commentary’) provides that 
[a] peace agreement, ceasefire or other accord may also constitute a special 
agreement for the purposes of common Article 3 … if it contains clauses that 
bring into existence further obligations drawn from the Geneva Conventions 
and/or their Additional Protocols … such as the granting of an amnesty for 
fighters who have carried out their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war, the release of all captured persons, or a commitment to search for 
the missing. … Likewise, an agreement may contain obligations drawn from 
human rights law and help to implement humanitarian law.76 
Many peace agreements contain provisions relating to issues regulated by 
international humanitarian law. However, for example, the 2016 Final Peace 
Agreement (Colombia) includes lengthy sections on non-international 
humanitarian law related matters, ranging from land reform to the political 
participation of the former rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (‘FARC’).77 As the ICRC Commentary affirms, such an agreement 
 
 74 See, eg, Luisa Vierucci, ‘The Colombian Peace Agreement of 24 November 2016 and 
International Law: Some Preliminary Remarks’ (2017) (Autunno Inverno) Processi di pace 
e dignità umana 1, 2–4 (‘Colombian Peace Agreement’); Laura Betancur Restrepo, 
‘The Legal Status of the Colombian Peace Agreement’ (2016) 110 AJIL Unbound 188.  
 75 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) art 3 (‘Geneva Convention I ’).  
 76 Lindsey Cameron et al, ‘Article 3: Conflicts Not of an International Character’ in Knut 
Dörmann et al (eds), Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 134, 296–7.  
 77 See, eg, 2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia) (n 3) chs 1–2.  
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may constitute a special agreement only to the extent that it aims to implement 
international humanitarian law, including the relevant rules of international 
human rights law.78 
 This raises the second question of whether a peace agreement gains 
international legal status to the extent that it constitutes a special agreement; 
that is, whether special agreements are regarded as sources of international 
obligations. Notwithstanding the proviso in Common Article 3 that the 
application of its provisions, including the conclusion of special agreements, 
‘shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict’,79 could it be argued 
that the article attaches legal status to special agreements? Some scholars argue 
that special agreements can be treaties proper 80  or sources of international 
obligations regardless of their formal classification.81 However, although many 
states have concluded special agreements with AOGs as per Common Article 3, 
there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that these are considered to  
be international agreements.82  A 1994 agreement between the Guatemalan 
government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity demonstrates the 
hesitation that governments may have in concluding special agreements formally 
classified as such, despite the dominant view that they do not confer 
treaty-making capacity or legal personality to AOGs. The parties explicitly state 
that the agreement does not ‘constitute a special agreement, in the terms of 
article 3 (Common), paragraph 2, second subparagraph of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949’, 83 although, in objective terms, the agreement includes 
guarantees stemming from international humanitarian law.84 
Proponents of the view that special agreements are binding qua international 
law further refer to the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), 85  particularly the Prosecutor v Tadić 86  appeal 
 
 78 Cameron et al (n 76) 297. See below Part IV(A)(1) on the reasons behind the strategy of the 
Colombian parties to attach purported special agreement status to the entire peace 
agreement.  
 79 Geneva Convention I (n 75) art 3.  
 80 Vierucci, ‘Special Agreements’ (n 20) 412; Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 4) 143–6; Zegveld 
(n 15) 28–30.  
 81 Ezequiel Heffes and Marcos D Kotlik, ‘Special Agreements as a Means of Enhancing 
Compliance with IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts: An Inquiry into the Governing 
Legal Regime’ (2014) 96(895/896) International Review of the Red Cross 1195, 1216–22; 
Marco Sassòli, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve Their Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1(1) Journal of International Humanitarian Legal 
Studies 5, 30.  
 82 See ‘Other Instruments’, Customary International Humanitarian Law Database (Web Page) 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/src_iiotin>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/L9YL-JGX8>, which lists special agreements among ‘other instruments’ 
instead of among ‘treaties’. See also Kassoti (n 23) 69, who maintains that theories 
attempting to justify the binding force of these special agreements under international law 
have not prevailed so far; Dinstein (n 71) 71, arguing that special agreements do not 
generate international obligations but may be sources of domestic legal obligations. 
 83 Letter Dated 8 April 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, UN GAOR, 48th sess, Agenda Item 
40; UN SCOR, 49th sess, UN Docs A/48/928 and S/1994/448 (19 April 1994) annex I 
(‘Comprehensive Agreement Human Rights’) art IX(2). 
 84 Ibid art IX(1). 
 85 See, eg, Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 4) 145. 
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judgment and the Prosecutor v Blaškić87 and Prosecutor v Galić88 (‘Galić’) trial 
judgments, in which the Tribunal referred to the special agreements concluded 
between the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these 
judgments, the Chambers relied on special agreements principally to establish 
their subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of certain provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols.89 Special agreements were 
thus accorded legal force only in relation to bringing into application 
international humanitarian law. The Trial Chamber treated a special agreement 
as an autonomous source of international obligations in only the Galić trial 
judgment, although without elaborating on its reasoning, to establish its subject-
matter jurisdiction over the crime of spreading terror among the civilian 
population.90 The Appeals Chamber, on the other hand, held that the crime of 
terror was part of customary international humanitarian law and did not rely on 
the special agreement or treaty law.91 Therefore, it did not discuss whether the 
special agreement in question was binding qua international law. As such, the 
case law of the ICTY remains too scant and ambiguous to provide guidance on 
the legal status of special agreements. Given also the lack of evidence in support 
of their binding force in the relevant state practice, it seems premature to 
conclude that peace agreements may gain international legal force even if they 
constitute special agreements. 
2 Security Council Practice regarding Peace Agreements 
The UNSC has been significantly involved in the resolution of intrastate 
armed conflicts, including by urging the conclusion of and compliance with 
negotiated settlements. It has urged conflicting parties to enter into a ceasefire  
or peace agreement,92  welcomed93  or endorsed peace agreements,94  called 
for/demanded/encouraged/invited compliance with peace agreement 
 
 86 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, 
Case No IT-94-1-I-T, 2 October 1995). 
 87 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000) (‘Blaškić’). 
 88 Prosecutor v Galić (Judgement and Opinion) (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003) [25] 
(‘Galić’). 
 89 See Blaškić (n 87) [172]; Galić (n 88) [22]–[25], [95]–[96]; Tadić (n 86) [143]–[145]. 
 90 Galić (n 88) [95]–[96], [138]. For a detailed discussion of the judgments and other uses of 
special agreements in the case law of the ICTY, see Vierucci, ‘Special Agreements’ (n 20). 
 91 Prosecutor v Galić (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006) [83]–[85]. 
 92 See, eg, SC Res 2118, UN SCOR, 7038th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2118 (27 September 2013) 
annex II (‘Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué’) para 11.  
 93 See, eg, SC Res 2366, 2366th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2366 (10 July 2017) Preamble para 2. 
 94 See, eg, SC Res 1383, UN SCOR, 4434th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1383 (6 December 2001) 
para 1; SC Res 1464, UN SCOR, 4700th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1464 (4 February 2003)  
para 1; SC Res 2202, UN SCOR, 7384th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2202 (17 February 2015)  
para 1. 
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commitments,95 characterised noncompliance with peace agreements as threats 
to peace,96 deplored or condemned noncompliance97 and imposed sanctions in 
case of noncompliance with a peace agreement.98 Surveying the practice of the 
UNSC in relation to 46 non-international armed conflicts active during the 1990–
2013 period, Gregory H Fox, Kristen E Boon and Isaac Jenkins find that the 
UNSC ‘ordered’ AOGs to abide by peace agreements in 83% of such conflicts 
and established sanctions to induce compliance in situations including those of 
Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.99 The UNSC has 
also supported the UN’s good offices and mediation services in intrastate 
conflicts,100 authorised peacekeeping missions to support the implementation of 
peace agreements101  and established transitional administration and peace 
building operations in exceptional cases, such as those of East Timor 102 and 
Kosovo.103 
It is hard to adduce any evidence from the UNSC’s welcomes or 
endorsements as to the international or binding character of a peace agreement. 
It is similarly difficult to establish a correlation between the imposition of 
sanctions in case of noncompliance with peace agreement obligations and their 
legal status, as the former does not necessarily require the determination of a 
violation of international law.104 On the other hand, some scholars argue that the 
UNSC’s practice of exhorting peace agreement parties, including AOGs,  
to comply with their undertakings provides evidence for the increasing 
recognition that peace agreements between governments and AOGs to end 
intrastate armed conflicts may be binding as a matter of customary international 
law.105 
 
 95 See, eg, SC Res 851, UN SCOR, 3254th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/851 (15 July 1993) 
(‘Resolution 851’); SC Res 942, UN SCOR, 3428th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/942 (23 September 
1994) para 4; SC Res 999, UN SCOR, 3544th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/999 (16 June 1995) para 
10; SC Res 1270, UN SCOR, 4054th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1270 (22 October 1999) para 2 
(‘Resolution 1270’); SC Res 1334, UN SCOR, 4253rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1334  
(22 December 2000) para 2; SC Res 1346, UN SCOR, 4306th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1346  
(30 March 2001) paras 7, 10; SC Res 1527, UN SCOR, 4909th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1527  
(4 February 2004) Preamble para 4; SC Res 1528, UN SCOR, 4918th mtg, UN Doc 
S/RES/1528 (27 February 2004) para 10; SC Res 1572, UN SCOR, 5708th mtg, UN Doc 
S/RES/1572 (15 November 2004) paras 3–4 (‘Resolution 1572’); SC Res 1765, UN SCOR, 
5716th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1765 (16 July 2007) para 2. 
 96 See, eg, SC Res 864, UN SCOR, 3277th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/864 (15 September 1993) pt B 
(‘Resolution 864’). 
 97 See, eg, Resolution 851, UN Doc S/RES/851 (n 95) paras 5–7; Resolution 1572, UN Doc 
S/RES/1572 (n 95) para 1. 
 98 See, eg, SC Res 1127, UN SCOR, 3814th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997) 
Preamble para 7, para 4 (‘Resolution 1127’); SC Res 1521, UN SCOR, 4890th mtg, UN Doc 
S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) Preamble paras 6, 8, para 4. 
 99 Fox, Boon and Jenkins (n 16) 677. 
 100 See, eg, SC Res 2042, UN SCOR, 6751st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2042 (14 April 2012) para 1. 
 101 See, eg, Resolution 1270, UN Doc S/RES/1270 (n 95) para 8(a); SC Res 1509, UN SCOR, 
UN Doc S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) paras 1, 3(a). 
 102 SC Res 1272, UN SCOR 4057th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1272 (25 October 1999) paras 1–3. 
 103 SC Res 1244, UN SCOR, 4011th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) paras 5–11. 
 104 See Tom Ruys, ‘Sanctions, Retortions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International 
Legal Framework’ in Larissa van den Herik (ed), Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and 
International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 19, 23, 36.  
 105 Fox, Boon and Jenkins (n 16) 676–8. See also Wittke (n 4) 202–8.  
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First of all, this argument assumes that the UNSC resolutions can be evidence 
of customary international law in themselves — that is, as resolutions of an 
international organisation rather than as means by which the practice and/or 
opinio juris of member states can be identified, for example, by reference to their 
votes or statements during debates.106 It is beyond the scope of this article to 
fully examine this argument. However, it suffices to mention that it does not find 
unambiguous support in the current state of international law. For instance, 
conclusion 12, para 2 in the draft conclusions on identification of customary 
international law adopted by the International Law Commission in 2018 provides 
that 
[a] resolution adopted by an international organization or at an 
intergovernmental conference may provide evidence for determining the 
existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute 
to its development.107  
The Commission clarifies in the commentary to conclusion 12 that  
[a]lthough the resolutions of organs of international organizations are acts 
of those organs, in the context of the present draft conclusion what matters 
is that they may reflect the collective expression of the views of States 
members of such organs …108  
Therefore, the Commission does not consider the resolutions as the practice of 
the UNSC contributing to the identification of customary international law.109 
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this article, regardless of 
whether the UNSC resolutions are considered to be practice of the international 
organisation evidencing custom or a means of identifying the views of member 
states, a closer review of the UNSC resolutions addressing compliance of the 
parties with peace agreements does not lead to an unequivocal conclusion that 
the UNSC, or its member states, regards peace agreements as sources of binding 
international obligations. The UNSC has invited, urged, emphasised the 
necessity of, called for and demanded compliance with peace agreements  
in several situations.110 For example, in relation to the situation in Angola, the 
UNSC condemned UNITA for its continuing use of military violence and 
demanded that they ‘abide fully by the “Acordos de Paz”’ concluded in 1991.111 
 
 106 See Gregory Fox, ‘Security Council Resolutions as Evidence of Customary International 
Law’, EJIL: Talk! (Blog Post, 1 March 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-
resolutions-as-evidence-of-customary-international-law/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/
K5NF-2WLK>.  
 107 Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth Session (30 April – 1 June and 2 
July – 10 August 2018), UN GAOR, 73rd sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/73/10 (2018) 121. 
 108 Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Eighth Session (2 May – 10 June and 4 
July – 12 August 2016), UN GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10 (2016) 107.  
 109 See also Niels Blokker, ‘International Organizations and Customary International Law: 
Is the International Law Commission Taking International Organizations Seriously?’ (2017) 
14(1) International Organizations Law Review 1, 9–10.  
 110 See above n 95 and accompanying text. If one adopts the position that only the verb ‘decide’ 
indicates binding character in UNSC resolutions, then the range of verbs used by the UNSC 
regarding compliance with peace agreements does not indicate binding character. However, 
even if it is assumed that the verb ‘demand’ also indicates binding character, the legal 
source of the parties’ obligation to comply with a peace agreement would be the UNSC 
resolution and not the peace agreement. 
 111 Resolution 851, UN Doc S/RES/851 (n 95) paras 4–5.  
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Upon UNITA’s continued failure to cease military action, in 1993, the UNSC 
determined that the situation in Angola constituted a ‘threat to international 
peace and security’.112 In 1997, the UNSC demanded UNITA’s compliance with 
the Lusaka Protocol of 1994,113 and, acting under ch VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, it decided on a range of measures to be taken against UNITA by 
the member states of the UN.114 It further expressed ‘its readiness to consider the 
imposition of additional measures, such as trade and financial restrictions, if 
UNITA does not fully comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol’.115 
Although the UNSC attached clear significance to a negotiated solution to the 
conflict in Angola through the implementation of the Peace Accords for 
Angola 116  and the Lusaka Protocol, its pronouncements do not necessarily 
suggest that it considered the obligations under these agreements to be of 
international legal nature.117 
Another noteworthy example is found in the UNSC engagement with the 
situation in Darfur. In Resolutions 1769 and 1828, the UNSC demanded that 
‘the parties to the conflict in Darfur fulfil their international obligations  
and their commitments under relevant agreements, this resolution and other 
relevant Council resolutions’.118 According to the preamble of Resolution 1769, 
the relevant agreements in this context include the 2006 Tripoli Agreement to 
Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan119 
and subsequent bilateral agreements between Sudan and Chad addressing the 
conflict in Darfur,120 in addition to the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.121 It is 
not clear whether the UNSC distinguished between ‘international obligations’ 
and ‘commitments’ as different types of undertakings, nor is it apparent whether 
the UNSC characterised the obligations under the Darfur Peace Agreement as 
‘international obligations’ or as ‘commitments’. It may be argued that the phrase 
‘international obligations’ refers only to the obligations under the interstate 
 
 112 Resolution 864, UN Doc S/RES/864 (n 96) pt B.  
 113 Resolution 1127, UN Doc S/RES/1127 (n 98) para 2. 
 114 Ibid pt B.  
 115 Ibid para 9.  
 116 Letter Dated 17 May 1991 from the Charge d’Affaires A1 of the Permanent Mission of 
Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/22609 
(17 May 1991) annex (‘Letter Dated 8 May 1991 from the Minister for External Relations of 
Angola to the Secretary-General’) enclosure (‘Peace Accords for Angola’). 
 117 In some resolutions where the UNSC makes a determination of a violation of international 
human rights or humanitarian law, it emphasises that those responsible must be brought to 
justice: see, eg, SC Res 1791, UN SCOR, 5809th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1791 (19 December 
2007) para 7; SC Res 1865, UN SCOR, 6076th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1865 (27 January 2009) 
para 11. However, the UNSC has not made similar statements regarding violations of peace 
agreements.  
 118 SC Res 1769, UN SCOR, 5727th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) para 22 
(emphasis added) (‘Resolution 1769’); SC Res 1828, UN SCOR, 5947th mtg, UN Doc 
S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008) para 16 (emphasis added).  
 119 Letter Dated 14 February 2006 from the Chargé d’Affaires AI of the Permanent Mission of 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/2006/103 (15 February 2006) annex II (‘Tripoli Agreement to 
Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan’). 
 120 Resolution 1769, UN Docs S/RES/1769 (n 118) Preamble paras 11, 15. 
 121 Darfur Peace Agreement, Sudan–Sudan Liberation Movement/Army–Justice and Equality 
Movement, signed 5 May 2006 <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/535>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/Z7FH-2U4H>. 
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agreements and UNSC resolutions, which are cited as ‘relevant agreements’, 
but not to the commitments under the peace agreement. 
Although the UNSC has similarly referred to the commitments, obligations or 
responsibilities of parties to peace agreements in several situations, it has not 
expressly characterised these as international, or even as legal, undertakings. 
Therefore, the practice of the UNSC remains inconclusive as to the recognition 
of the treaty-making capacity of AOGs that are parties to a peace agreement or 
the legal status of such agreements otherwise.122 The emphasis of the UNSC on 
seeking negotiated settlements to armed conflicts and on complying with peace 
agreements can be explained more convincingly by reference to the potential of 
negotiated settlements for the maintenance or restoration of international peace 
and security, as the UNSC has gradually broadened its interpretation of a ‘threat 
to peace’ to also include intrastate armed conflicts.123 
To recapitulate, the analysis in Part II demonstrates that peace agreements 
concluded between a state and one or more AOGs to end an intrastate armed 
conflict do not yet constitute international agreements due to the lack of 
treaty-making capacity of the latter in international law. There seem to be two 
main exceptions to this conclusion. First, peace agreements with a double 
character, that is, agreements signed by more than one state and AOGs, may 
constitute international agreements, but only as between states party. Secondly, 
peace agreements with national liberation movements, representing a people 
entitled to the right to self-determination and pursuing national liberation, may 
carry international legal force if they are concluded in written form and the 
parties intended them to be binding.124  For example, the agreements signed 
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, especially the 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (commonly 
 
 122 The International Law Association Committee on Non State Actors also reached the same 
conclusion in this matter: Committee on Non State Actors, International Law Association, 
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Dinh, Droit international public, ed Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet (LGDJ, 7th ed, 2002) 
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referred to as the Oslo Accords), 125  are widely recognised as international 
agreements.126 
The conclusion of Part II that the majority of peace agreements with AOGs do 
not possess international legal status raises the question of whether these 
agreements reflect an intention for them to be legally binding on the international 
level but fail to be so merely due to the formal obstacle of the treaty-making 
capacity of AOGs. Therefore, the next section turns to this question and 
examines whether peace agreements are drafted in a way that demonstrates an 
intention to create (international) legal obligations, or instead are political 
commitments. 
III INTENTION TO CREATE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER A 
PEACE AGREEMENT 
The drafting process of the VCLT indicates that the element of ‘intention to 
create obligations under international law’ is embraced in the phrase ‘governed 
by international law’. 127  Many objective factors, such as the requirement of 
ratification of a treaty, provisions regarding entry into force, the inclusion of 
compulsory judicial settlement mechanisms, international registration, the actual 
terms of the agreement, the choice of language and the circumstances of its 
conclusion,128 as well as the certainty of the subject matter of the treaty,129 may 
be considered for the determination of the intention of the parties. The criterion 
of intention also features in the process-based accounts of the legal normativity 
of peace agreements that depart from the ‘source thesis’130 and concepts such as 
subjectivity or lawmaking capacity. Inspired by the New Haven School, Ezequiel 
Heffes and Marcos D Kotlik, for example, propose to focus on the participation 
of AOGs in lawmaking processes instead of their lawmaking capacity. 
 
 125 Letter Dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation 
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Thus, they argue that agreements with AOGs aiming to bring into force 
humanitarian provisions, including special agreements and peace agreements,  
can be understood as creating international law through an authoritative decision 
made by relevant actors that interact within the realm of international relations 
and with the intention to bind themselves to a set of rules designed to regulate 
such interaction.131  
Overall, in relation to peace agreements, three main factors have been noted 
in scholarship as indicators of an intention to create international obligations: 
first, formal features, such as provisions regarding entry into force, international 
registration, use of legal language and precision of obligations; secondly, 
international aspects of the subject matter and references to international law; 
and thirdly, international involvement in agreement monitoring, implementation, 
enforcement and dispute settlement. These factors should be examined on a 
case-by-case basis, but the following discussion focuses on whether these 
features are commonly found in peace agreements and whether they necessarily 
denote an intention to create international obligations. 
A Formal Features of Peace Agreements 
Only in the case of a small number of peace agreements have the parties 
explicitly indicated the legal nature of the agreement. The parties to the 1994 
Lusaka Protocol, for example, reiterated their acceptance of the Peace Accords 
for Angola among the ‘relevant legal instruments’ to the resolution of the 
Angolan conflict, along with the relevant UNSC resolutions.132 The later 2002 
Luena Agreement of Angola rather ambiguously reaffirmed the continuing 
validity of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol as a ‘political-juridical instrument’. 133 
Similarly ambiguous is the acceptance of the parties to the 2015 Agreement for 
Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process that the 
‘annexe as well as the Declaration of the Parties to the Algiers Process … form 
an integral part of the Agreement and have the same legal status as the other 
provisions in the body of the text’,134 despite previously undertaking to ‘take the 
necessary measures to adopt the regulatory, legislative and constitutional 
measures needed to implement the provisions of the present Agreement’.135  
It is open to argument whether the implementing measures are intended to give 
legal force to the peace agreement or to elaborate on and complement it. 
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<https://perma.cc/8N7R-EXTD> [tr University of Edinburgh, ‘Agreement for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Mali Emanating from the Algiers Process’, PA-X Peace Agreement 
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Moreover, there is not any indication that the claimed legal status is of 
international character. As mentioned above,136 the 2016 Final Peace Agreement 
(Colombia) is a rare example that elucidates its ‘international standing’ as ‘a 
Special Agreement pursuant to Article 3, common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions’.137 However, arguably as an indication of the parties’ hesitation 
about the purported international standing of the Agreement, they also requested 
the incorporation of the Agreement into a UNSC resolution as well as into the 
Colombian constitution.138 
Although peace agreements rarely pronounce on their legal status, almost all 
agreements mimic legal form and language, for instance, by using words such as 
‘shall’ or ‘agree’, in formulating obligations.139  As typical of international 
treaties, peace agreements also contain provisions on their entry into force, 
amendment and implementation in good faith. Some are deposited before 
international organisations or actors. The 2005 CPA is, for example, lodged with 
the UN, the African Union (‘AU’), the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development Secretariat in Djibouti, the League of Arab States and the Republic 
of Kenya.140 Many peace agreements are also submitted to the UN Secretary-
General to be ‘circulated as a document of the Security Council’.141 However, 
unless parties explicitly attach international legal status to the agreement, as in 
the case of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia), legalisation techniques 
such as the mimicking of treaty language and form may not be conclusive in and 
of themselves of the parties’ intention to commit to international, let alone legal, 
obligations. These legalisation techniques may rather be used by peacemaking 
parties to enhance compliance with the agreement both by underlining the 
parties’ commitment to their obligations and increasing the reputational costs of 
reneging on those commitments. 
B References to International Law and to Matters Regulated by International 
Law in a Peace Agreement 
Peace agreements frequently contain references to international law. 
Such references range from general commitments of parties to respect 
international law142 to specific international rules or instruments.143 Many issues 
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regulated by peace agreements — for example, elections, autonomy and 
self-governance in sub-state regions, and human rights — are also relevant to the 
rules and principles of international law, even in the absence of explicit 
references by the parties. As the subject matter of peace agreements has been 
taken into account in the debate on the legal status of peace agreements,144 
it may be worth asking whether references to international law and to matters 
regulated by international law in a peace agreement can be indicative. As Olivier 
Corten and Pierre Klein also note, such references often function as a restatement 
of the state party’s commitment to its existing obligations under international law 
and are commonly found also in domestic legal instruments. 145  Therefore, 
they do not necessarily reflect an intention to undertake new international legal 
obligations under the peace agreement. Moreover, regardless of whether a state 
commits to respecting its existing international obligations or to ratifying 
international treaties in a peace agreement, the legal status of such commitments 
themselves are not transformed by virtue of the international character of their 
subject matter. Although certainty of subject matter has been considered in the 
determination of the legal status of agreements or specific provisions,146 
the content of an agreement in general has no bearing on its legal status.147 
C International Monitoring, Implementation and Dispute Settlement 
Peace agreement parties often delegate important roles to international actors 
— ranging from international and regional organisations to third states — in the 
implementation of peace agreements, including peacekeeping, agreement 
monitoring and verification, and assistance (for example, electoral, constitutional 
or technical assistance).148 Some peace agreements also provide for international 
dispute settlement, such as in relation to the settlement of the territorial disputes 
over the Abyei region in Sudan149 and the Brčko district in Bosnia.150 In some 
rare cases, they even provide for international territorial administration, as, 
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for instance, in the case of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, commonly referred to as the Erdut 
Agreement. 151  Some scholars argue that the delegation of such roles to 
international actors, particularly the submission of disputes to international 
dispute settlement, demonstrates the intention of parties to create an 
internationally binding peace agreement.152 However, as opposed to an intention 
to create legally binding obligations on the international level, the 
‘internationalised’ aspects of peace agreements seem to be associated rather with 
negotiating parties or involved international actors’ desire to enhance the 
credibility of an agreement and its implementation record. 
It could nonetheless be argued that such provisions may be sources of 
international obligations between the state party to the peace agreement and third 
states or international organisations that are accorded implementation roles, 
regardless of the legal status of the agreement in its entirety, if they are intended 
to be binding as such.153  However, such provisions often take the form of 
invitations, requests or authorisations by conflict parties rather than as legal 
obligations undertaken by external actors.154  In lieu of relying on peace 
agreements as the legal framework for their involvement, external actors often 
enter into separate international agreements with host/recipient states or, in the 
case of international and regional organisations, enact resolutions in order to 
establish a legal framework for the implementation of the roles delegated to them 
by a peace agreement. For example, as to peacekeeping missions in support of 
agreement implementation, peace agreements provide the basis for consent, 
whereas a subsequent resolution by the UNSC or a regional organisation and 
status of forces agreements with host states establish the legal framework. 
External actors may also enter into agreements for the provision of technical or 
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financial assistance to agreement implementation and post-conflict reforms.155 
As such, despite the lack of international legal status of peace agreements,  
the international aspects of peace agreements, that is, the components relating to 
the involvement of international actors, can be accommodated and ‘legalised’ 
through different legal avenues. 
D Are Peace Agreements of ‘International’ Character? 
As the preceding sections demonstrate, the treaty-like form, references to 
international law, or provision for international monitoring, implementation and 
dispute settlement in a peace agreement do not necessarily indicate an intention 
to create international obligations in the context of peace agreements. The effect 
of such factors on the legal nature of agreements between states and non-state 
entities has also been evaluated in the context of ‘internationalised’ state 
contracts. For instance, in the Texaco v Libya arbitral ruling, mentioned above in 
relation to the treaty-making capacity of non-state entities, the sole arbitrator 
Dupuy considered the following as the three criteria of ‘internationalisation’ in 
relation to the law governing state contracts: reference to general principles of 
law as part of the applicable law, provision for international arbitration and the 
character of the agreement at issue as an economic development agreement.156 
This followed on from his assertion that state contracts derive their binding 
nature from international law, which empowered the parties to determine the law 
applicable to their contracts.157 Many commentators, on the other hand, remain 
of the view that state contracts remain ordinary contracts, breaches of which do 
not entail responsibility under international law, despite displaying such 
characteristics.158 
Regardless of which of the two views is taken to reflect the state of 
international law on state contracts, the relevance of that conclusion to the debate 
on the legal nature of peace agreements may nonetheless be questioned due to a 
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fundamental difference between state contracts and peace agreements. As the 
sole arbitrator Dupuy emphasised, state contracts are considered international 
contracts ‘both in the economic sense because they [involve] the interests of 
international trade and in the strict legal sense because they [include] factors 
connecting them to different States’. 159  The international character of peace 
agreements as such, on the other hand, is not as easily established as that of state 
contracts: first, peace agreements are concluded between a state and a sub-state 
entity that is not necessarily connected to a different state. Secondly, although 
conclusion of a peace agreement involves the interests of international peace and 
security, peace agreements concern matters that are predominantly of intrastate 
nature, that is, relating to the legal and political order within a state. Therefore, 
the rationale behind the recognition of state contracts as ‘internationalised’ 
contracts — as sources of international legal obligations despite not being 
characterised as international agreements proper — does not apply to peace 
agreements. 
IV THE LACK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF PEACE AGREEMENTS: 
(WHY) DOES IT MATTER? 
At first blush, the conclusion that a peace agreement between a state and an 
AOG does not constitute an international agreement does read rather 
disconcertingly, as if it is to deny such agreements the positive consequences and 
functions of international legal status. The main legal consequence of the 
characterisation of a peace agreement as an international agreement would be for 
the peace agreement to be governed by international law, most importantly by 
the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility. The doctrinal inclination 
towards the recognition of the international legal status of peace agreements, 
however, seems not to be driven by such formalist legal consequences, but rather 
concentrates on the functions that legal status purportedly plays in upholding the 
agreement before domestic and international courts, facilitating the conclusion of 
an agreement by the parties and enhancing its compliance.160 For instance, it has 
been suggested that an important consequence of the classification of a peace 
agreement as an international agreement would be that it could be invoked in 
domestic and international courts.161 Furthermore, Christine Bell suggests that 
the recognition of ‘peace agreement’ as a distinct legal category of hybrid, 
internationalised instrument — that is, as lex pacificatoria — is in itself a 
‘conflict resolution project’, as  
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peace agreement use of legal form is driven by the need to design a set of 
obligations that will best lock a range of state, nonstate, and international actors 
into a set of future relationships capable of implementing the peace agreement.162 
The objectives of enhancing compliance with an agreement and invoking it 
before domestic and international courts appear to be also behind the invocation 
of international legal status by parties to or beneficiaries of peace agreements, as 
in the case of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia). In referring to the 
peace agreement as a special agreement as per its international standing, the 
Colombian government and the FARC aimed to use international law as a 
‘tool that will help guarantee peace and promote legal security to parties torn 
apart by war and mutual distrust’.163 Against this backdrop, the next two sections 
examine whether international legal status may in fact function as, first, a shield 
from domestic and international judicial challenges and, secondly, an incentive 
to conclude and comply with a peace agreement. Upon closer analysis, 
the conclusion that peace agreements lack international legal status seems less 
disconcerting, as the role international legal status plays in shielding an 
agreement from judicial challenges and inducing compliance, if any, seems to be 
more limited and contingent than generally assumed. 
A International Legal Status as a Shield from Domestic and International 
Judicial Challenges 
1 Domestic Judicial Challenges 
The major domestic judicial challenge that peace agreements often face is the 
challenge of unconstitutionality directed at the agreement or implementing 
constitutional amendments and laws. 164  This challenge arises when a peace 
agreement is aimed to be legally implemented within the framework of an 
existing constitution — that is, when a new constitution is not brought into effect 
by a peace agreement that either is concluded as a constitution or provides for the 
making of a new constitution. 165  The legal or constitutional change in 
implementation of a peace agreement may be procedurally or substantively in 
contravention of the existing constitution. Procedurally, the process of legal 
incorporation may not be in accordance with the constitutionally stipulated 
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constitutional amendment or lawmaking procedure. Substantively, provisions of 
a peace agreement may not be in conformity with the substantive principles of a 
constitution; for instance, such tension may arise between amnesty provisions 
and the rule of law guarantees, or between provisions on autonomy and 
self-governance and the principle of territorial integrity. The claim that a peace 
agreement possesses international legal status is, in this context, connected to the 
aim to avert such unconstitutionality challenges by shielding the agreement or its 
implementing constitutional amendment and laws from judicial challenge, 
without addressing the substantive unconstitutionality per se. However, whether 
international legal status can in fact play this role in the entrenchment of peace 
agreements in domestic law depends on the role the respective domestic legal 
system accords to international law. 
In Colombia, for example, the strategy of the parties to claim international 
standing for the 2016 Final Peace Agreement (Colombia) was partly driven by 
the need to shield the constitutional amendments and laws adopted in 
implementation of the Agreement from unconstitutionality challenges before the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia. 166  According to the doctrine of the 
constitutional block adopted in Colombia, certain rules or instruments of 
international law are accorded constitutional status; they become part of the 
framework against which the Constitutional Court assesses the constitutionality 
of constitutional amendments or laws.167 However, the strategy of the parties to 
incorporate the Peace Agreement into the constitutional block by attaching 
international legal status to it was forestalled by the Constitutional Court, which 
ruled that the Peace Agreement would not be automatically included in the 
Colombian constitution and that the result of the plebiscite on the Peace 
Agreement would only be binding on the President and not on all state 
authorities.168 Rejected in the plebiscite, the Agreement was then renegotiated by 
the parties as to stipulate, inter alia, that the Agreement would not be part of  
the Constitution or the constitutional block but only a parameter for  
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the interpretation of the implementing laws for three presidential terms.169 
The parties retained the reference to special agreement status in the renegotiated 
agreement, but arguably merely for symbolic purposes to emphasise the partly 
humanitarian nature of the Agreement.170  Nevertheless, in Colombia, it is 
theoretically possible for a peace agreement to gain constitutional status and be 
shielded from unconstitutionality challenges if the agreement has the status of an 
international agreement, due to the recognition of the doctrine of the 
constitutional block. 
In most jurisdictions, on the other hand, constitutions are accorded primacy 
over ratified international treaties. Therefore, even if peace agreements were to 
be accepted or signed as international treaties, they would not survive an 
unconstitutionality challenge merely by virtue of their international status.171 
This was affirmed indirectly by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its 
decision on the constitutionality of the MOA-AD between the Philippine 
government and the MILF.172  One of the grounds of unconstitutionality put 
forward by the petitioners was that the government’s peace panel committed a 
grave abuse of discretion by undertaking in the MOA-AD to amend the 
Philippine constitution and existing laws to ensure their conformity with the 
Agreement, as the promise of constitutional amendment meant that the 
amendment procedure established by the Constitution would not be observed.173 
Upholding the petition in this respect, the Court held that the government, 
by promising to amend the Constitution, usurped the constituent powers vested 
by the Philippine Constitution only in Congress (Constituent Assembly), 
the delegates to a Constitutional Convention and the people themselves (People’s 
Initiative).174  In this context, the Court also addressed the concern of the 
petitioners that the government may have assumed an obligation under 
international law to amend the Constitution by signing the MOA-AD.175 
As explained above, the Court held that the MOA-AD was not a binding 
agreement under international law, but what is notable is the Court’s further 
statement that ‘guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, 
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion’. 176 Therefore, regardless of 
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whether the peace agreement possessed international legal status or not, 
the promise of constitutional amendment without following the procedure to do 
so was found to be unconstitutional. 
The role of international legal status in shielding a peace agreement from 
domestic judicial challenges, particularly that of unconstitutionality, first and 
foremost depends on the acceptance of peace agreements as international 
agreements by domestic courts, which have not to date departed from the 
dominant position in international law established above.177 However, even if it 
were recognised that peace agreements possess international legal status, whether 
an international agreement is ipso facto immune from unconstitutionality 
challenges as a matter of domestic law also depends on whether international law 
is accorded supremacy over the constitution in a jurisdiction, which would rarely 
be the case.178 
2 International Judicial Challenges 
At the international level, laws and practices stemming from peace agreements 
are likely to be, and have been, challenged particularly before international 
criminal tribunals or international human rights courts. As to international 
criminal tribunals or the International Criminal Court, the significant question in 
this context is whether an amnesty granted by a peace agreement constitutes a 
bar to the jurisdiction of the court, as was the main issue in the Kallon decision 
of the SCSL. It is established that domestic amnesties do not preclude the 
jurisdiction of foreign or international courts where such courts can validly assert 
jurisdiction under international law over the prosecution of crimes covered by 
the amnesty.179 What if the said amnesty is provided through an international 
agreement? In the Kallon case, although the SCSL upheld its jurisdiction by 
finding that the Lomé Peace Agreement was not an international agreement and 
could not be a bar to its jurisdiction, it is notable that the SCSL did not preclude 
the challenge that an amnesty grounded in an international agreement could bar 
the jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal.180 However, even if the 
Lomé Peace Agreement were an international agreement, it would still not 
necessarily prevail over the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ‘since 
the Special Court itself was not a party to the Accord [(Lomé Peace Agreement)] 
and, even if it were, the Accord would still not necessarily trump the Special 
Court’s Statute’.181  A similar issue also arose before the ICTY. One of the 
challenges put forward by Radovan Karadžić against the jurisdiction of the ICTY 
was an alleged agreement between him and mediator Richard Holbrooke, 
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reached during the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, that he would not be prosecuted by the ICTY in return for 
withdrawal from public life.182 Upholding the dismissal of the challenge by the 
Trial Chamber, albeit with slight differences in reasoning, the Appeals Chamber 
held that ‘the alleged Agreement, without a ratification of the alleged Agreement 
by a UNSC resolution, could not limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’,183 as 
‘the Statute of the Tribunal can only be amended or derogated by means of 
UNSC resolution’.184 These examples point out that, even if it were assumed that 
the concerned agreement constitutes an international agreement, an amnesty 
rooted in a peace agreement cannot be raised to challenge the jurisdiction of an 
international criminal court, as it cannot in and of itself amend or derogate from 
the founding instrument or the statute of the court. The international legal status 
of an agreement may also be irrelevant to its invocation before a foreign or 
international court, as amnesties typically only promise non-prosecution before 
domestic courts of the state party and do not extend to foreign or international 
courts.185  
International human rights courts may also receive cases concerning a peace 
agreement, as norm conflicts between a peace agreement and a human rights 
treaty may arise due to amnesty provisions or exclusionary power-sharing 
arrangements that implicate equality and non-discrimination guarantees. 
For instance, the power-sharing arrangement at the heart of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which bars non-members of constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, 
and Croats) from candidature to certain political positions,186 clashes with the 
non-discrimination guarantee of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’)187 and the right to free 
elections under art 3 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection  
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.188  In Sejdić v Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the European Court of Human Rights did not review this clash,  
as the power-sharing arrangement was incorporated into the constitutional 
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Court did not have jurisdiction 
ratione temporis at the time of the adoption of the Dayton Peace Agreement and 
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the relevant constitutional provisions. 189  Had the Court examined the norm 
conflict, could Bosnia and Herzegovina have argued that it could not assume 
responsibility for violating the ECHR — an international treaty — because it had 
undertaken a conflictual obligation under the Dayton Peace Agreement — 
another international treaty? Were the Dayton Peace Agreement not of a legal 
nature, there would not be a legal norm conflict in the first place. In this respect, 
the fact that the Dayton Peace Agreement is an international treaty makes a 
difference. However, the international legal status of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement places its provisions on power sharing merely on hierarchically equal 
standing with the ECHR. It does not in and of itself resolve the norm conflict and 
absolve Bosnia and Herzegovina of responsibility for violating the ECHR.190  
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive exploration 
of all potential domestic and international judicial challenges that a peace 
agreement may be subjected to. However, the examples suffice to demonstrate 
that international legal status alone would fail to shield peace agreements from 
domestic and international judicial challenges in many potential scenarios. 
B International Legal Status as an Incentive to Conclude and Comply with a 
Peace Agreement 
In the context of peacemaking, many purposes and functions are attached to 
the desire to grant peace agreements international legal status. In addition to the 
role that international legal status is hoped to play before domestic and 
international courts, these include the potential function of international legal 
status as a guarantee that noncompliance with a peace agreement would trigger 
international legal consequences, irrespective of its domestic legal fate. As such, 
the classification of a peace agreement as a source of international obligations 
may have implications on the prospects of parties entering into peace 
negotiations and concluding a peace agreement. 
As for AOGs, the prospect of recognition of the international legal status of a 
peace agreement may function as an incentive to enter into an agreement. First, 
the willingness of a state to undertake obligations under an international 
agreement may be considered a sign of strong commitment. Secondly, attributing 
international legal status to a peace agreement has symbolic significance for 
AOGs, who aim to gain international recognition and a degree of equality with 
the state party.191 For the same reason, however, states have been reluctant to 
attribute international legal personality or treaty-making capacity to AOGs and 
may hesitate to sign a peace agreement with international legal status. As such, 
international legal status is likely to prove a disincentive for states. 
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On the other hand, it is conceivable that for both state and AOG parties, 
binding force, particularly at the international level, may function as a 
confidence-building measure and incentivise them to conclude an agreement, 
violations of which would be sanctioned by law.192 The increased reputational 
cost of noncompliance with legal obligations may also be a factor in the 
durability of a peace agreement.193 Geoffrey R Watson refers to the challenges 
that the lack of legal status of a peace agreement may create and emphasises that 
it may make states disinclined ‘to bargain with sub-state entities, since existing 
states would have no assurance of return performance’.194 Therefore, he argues 
that international law should recognise peace agreements between states and 
sub-state entities as a ‘new species of binding international agreement’.195 
Although international legal status may increase the costs of noncompliance, 
it is important to note that the connection between legal status and compliance 
also depends on the context. Alex de Waal emphasises that  
[t]he validity of a formal agreement depends on the parties’ acceptance of it as 
final and binding. In turn this requires a political order with a high level of 
institutionalisation, which … is especially rare in countries prone to protracted 
and complicated insurgencies.196  
Another proviso regarding the role international status can play in enhancing 
compliance with agreements concerns the limited avenues available to AOGs in 
international dispute settlement, as arbitration appears to be the only 
possibility.197  Moreover, what appears to be the most relevant international 
guarantee, the oversight of the UNSC over a peace agreement, does not rely on 
its legal status, as explained above.198 Therefore, possibly due to the awareness 
of the parties that the agreement would lack standalone international or domestic 
legal status unless it is negotiated as a constitution from the outset, they often 
stipulate that the agreement shall be incorporated into domestic law, delegate 
implementation roles to external actors and request the oversight of the UN, 
particularly the UNSC. 
To recapitulate, attributing international legal status to a peace agreement may 
hypothetically enhance compliance due to the legal consequences of the 
violation of international obligations and increased international reputational 
costs. However, depending on the context, it may also diminish a state’s 
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willingness to conclude an agreement with an AOG and hinder public approval if 
it is construed as an attempt to bypass constitutionally established procedures of 
legal change.199 Therefore, any proposal for the legalisation of peace agreements 
at the international level should be tempered, given the possible unintended 
consequences that legalisation and internationalisation may trigger. 
C Internal and External Consequences of Negotiated Commitments to Peace 
Against the backdrop of the preceding analysis, it seems that peace 
agreements between governments and AOGs that aim to end an intrastate armed 
conflict may be more convincingly characterised as political agreements — 
unless a material peace agreement is adopted in the form of a domestic law, 
constitution or UNSC resolution — that function as internal roadmaps for post-
agreement legal and political reforms, as opposed to international legal 
agreements. This conclusion does not pose an obstacle to conceptualising peace 
agreements as ‘internationalised’ instruments in a non-legal sense, concluded 
and implemented with the extensive involvement of international actors.  
Nor does it relegate peace agreements to ‘scraps of paper’. As political 
agreements, peace agreements contain commitments that are binding in a 
political sense.200 As Oscar Schachter notes, albeit in the context of non-binding 
international agreements between states, ‘[t]here is no a priori reason to assume 
that the undertakings are illusory because they are not legal’.201 
Schachter further argues that non-binding international agreements contain 
political and moral commitments that generate internal and external 
consequences. Internally, they lead to legislative and administrative 
consequences; externally, they transform the subject matter from being 
exclusively within the reserved domain of one party to being a bilateral matter 
and they entitle the parties to monitor each other’s conduct.202  
Peace agreements, too, generate significant internal and external 
consequences as political agreements. Internally, peace agreements often 
generate consequences within the domestic legal and political system. For the 
state party, such consequences include the announcement of a ceasefire, 
incorporation of the peace agreement into domestic law or the initiation of the 
process of the adoption of a new constitution.203 For the AOG party, conclusion 
of a peace agreement often requires disarmament and transformation into a 
political party.204 
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Externally, peace agreements transform the matter of ending a conflict from a 
unilateral effort to a bilateral process, which also entails the public scrutiny of 
the agreement’s conclusion and implementation, as the parties to the agreement 
are accountable to (certain groups in) the society.205 In particular, the monitoring 
and dispute resolution mechanisms in peace agreements entitle parties to react to 
and request changes in each other’s conduct.206  Lastly, another external 
consequence of committing to a peace agreement is that external actors that are 
delegated roles in an agreement’s implementation and verification can also 
exhort the parties to comply with the agreement.207 
V CONCLUSION 
Peace agreements aiming to end intrastate armed conflicts between 
governments and AOGs have become more comprehensive, formal and 
internationalised during the last three decades. They are concluded in written 
form and drafted with language and features similar to those of international 
treaties. Moreover, they are negotiated and concluded in the presence of 
international witnesses, their content is informed by international law and they 
delegate significant implementation roles to international actors. However, such 
legalisation and internationalisation techniques do not suffice to render peace 
agreements sources of international obligations in the absence of treaty-making 
capacity of AOG parties and an intention to create international legal obligations. 
Therefore, unless and until they are incorporated into domestic law or their 
provisions are otherwise given legal effect in domestic or international law, 
peace agreements between governments and AOGs seem to remain political 
agreements. 
In the absence of standalone domestic or international legal status of peace 
agreements, giving legal effect to agreements in domestic law and enhancing the 
credibility of their implementation through international oversight mechanisms 
seem to be promising alternatives. Despite the difficulties of achieving the 
necessary public, parliamentary and/or judicial approval, the process of 
incorporation into domestic law may enhance the democratic credentials of a 
peace agreement and respect for the rule of law in a peace process. Moreover,  
it also enhances the involvement of the public and political actors beyond the 
negotiating parties in the legalisation of the agreement. To this end, and where 
feasible, respect for domestic legal change procedures and approval of an 
agreement through a referendum or parliamentary procedures may be sought in 
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the design of a peace agreement.208  It cannot be denied that legal and 
constitutional departures, which cannot be accommodated within a pre-existing 
domestic framework, may be required for achieving a negotiated compromise 
between warring parties. There may even be ‘legitimate’ grounds, however they 
are defined, for such illegal or unconstitutional departures. It is not the aim of 
this article to tackle the tensions between ‘permanent’ constitutions and peace 
agreements, but to point out that attaching international legal status to peace 
agreements cannot in and of itself avert this problem. 
Domestic implementation of a peace agreement can be enhanced by 
international monitoring and verification of the process. In addition to built-in 
guarantees of international facilitation in a peace agreement, the oversight of the 
UNSC over the implementation of a peace agreement may contribute to the 
credibility of the agreement and its implementation record, as it does not depend 
on an agreement’s legal status or require the consent of the parties. To conclude, 
enhancing the credibility of a peace agreement is crucial for both its conclusion 
in the first place and its subsequent implementation. The mechanisms and 
institutions to do so may be found beyond the supposed guarantees of 
international legal status, which peace agreements between governments and 
AOGs are not yet accorded. 
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